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Abstract—Formally, the Internet inter-domain routing system
is a collection of networks, their policies, peering relationships
and organizational affiliations, and the addresses they advertize.
It also includes components like Internet exchange points. By its
very definition, each and every aspect of this system is impacted
by BGP, the de-facto standard inter-domain routing protocol.
The element of this inter-domain routing system that has
attracted the single-most attention within the research commu-
nity has been the “inter-domain topology”. Unfortunately, almost
from the get go, the vast majority of studies of this topology,
from definition, to measurement, to modeling and analysis, have
ignored the central role of BGP in this problem. The legacy is a
set of specious findings, unsubstanciated claims, and ill-conceived
ideas about the Internet as a whole.
By presenting a BGP-focused state-of-the-art treatement of the
aspects that are critical for a rigorous study of this inter-domain
topology, we de-mythify in this paper many “controversial”
observations reported in the existing literature. At the same
time, we illustrate the benefits and richness of new scientific
approaches to measuring, modeling, and analyzing the inter-
domain topology that are faithful to the BGP-specific nature of
this problem domain.
Index Terms—Internet topology, modeling, BGP, routing
measurements, inference limitations
I. INTRODUCTION
The term “Internet” means (many) different things to (many)
different people. Even within the networking community, the
term is often used ambiguously, leading to misunderstandings
and confusion and creating roadblocks for a genuinely scien-
tific treatment of an engineered system that has revolutionized
the way we live.
While mathematics in the form of graph theory has been
equally culpable in adopting the use of this vague nomen-
clature, the “new science of networks” has popularized it to
the point where phrases like “topology of the Internet” or
“Internet graph” have entered the mainstream science lite-
rature, even though they are essentially meaningless without
precisely-stated definitions. For one, “Internet topology” could
refer to the connectivity structures encountered in any of the
seven OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) layers, from the
physical fiber and cable connections at the physical layer,
all the way to the virtual or logical connections associated
with applications such as the WWW (World Wide Web),
P2P networks (e.g., BitTorrent), or social media networks
(e.g., YouTube, Facebook, Twitter) at the application layer.
Moreover, by the very nature of this layered architecture of
the Internet, these different connectivity structures are shaped
by different sets of technological, economical, and societal
forces and evolve in response to different sets of external and
internal signals and responses. Each one of them only offers
a (different) glimpse at a global critical infrastructure whose
overall purpose and functionalities are determined by a set
of layer-specific protocols that run on millions of devices to
ensure connectivity among billions of users.
When trying to establish a precise meaning or interpretation
of the use of “Internet topology,” in much of the existing
literature, we find that the phrase has often been taken to mean
a virtual construct or graph created by the Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) routing protocol. Commonly referred to as
the inter-domain or Autonomous-System (AS) topology —
named after the logical blocks (ASes) that are used in BGP
to designate the origin and path of routing announcements —
it is this particular connectivity structure that we focus on in
this paper.
Our motivation for concentrating on this topology is
twofold. First, there has been a wealth of myths, miscon-
ceptions, and misinformation in the literature to date about
the AS-level Internet. The fundamental problem has been the
uncritical reliance on BGP as the main source of measure-
ments. By its very design, BGP is an information-hiding rather
than an information-revealing routing protocol, and using it for
mapping the Internet inter-domain topology is a “hack” and
not a purposefully designed measurement methodology. Being
a hack, it should come as no surprise that even though the
resulting data contain some amount of useful AS-related infor-
mation, it lacks critical Internet-wide routing state information
necessary for synthesizing the AS-level Internet. Second, when
carefully considering the specifics of the AS-level Internet
and making proper use of the existing domain knowledge
in this area, especially with respect to BGP, this particular
topology becomes an amazingly rich source of exciting new
problems whose solutions can be expected to provide a deep
understanding of critical issues (e.g., resilience, behavior under
real-world threats, future evolution) that will be paramount for
designing tomorrow’s Internet.
We are not the first to focus on the Internet AS-level
topology. In fact, there has been a number of excellent prior re-
views that provide a detailed description of the available mea-
surements and of the commonly-used modeling approaches
and analysis techniques that have been considered to date
for studying the AS topology (see, for example, [1]–[4]).
While some overlap with this earlier work is unavoidable,
the goal of this review is different. We seek to reflect on the
lessons learned from the past 10+ years of Internet topology
research. We will be destructive as well as constructive in
our criticism of previous efforts. On the destructive side, we
aim to debunk aspects of the published research concerning
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among networking and non-networking researchers alike, but
which fall apart when scrutinized by domain experts, or
tested with carefully vetted data. On the constructive side, our
effort is aimed at directing and guiding future AS topology
research into gainful new areas. To this end, we show how the
shortcomings in the existing state-of-the-art have generated
openings for a more rigorous, scientific treatment of the AS-
level Internet.
A. 10 Lessons from 10 Years of Studying the Internet Au-
tonomous System
Much of the published research on the AS-level Internet
seems convincing and sound. After all, the work adheres in
large parts to the traditional scientific method; that is, it is
typically grounded in real measurement data and follows a
generally-accepted modeling approach. However, to a critical
networking researcher, it is the very nature of this scientific
method which invites questions that probe the soundness of
each and every facet of AS-related findings reported in the exi-
sting literature. Despite their simplicity, these questions reflect
some two decades worth of experience with Internet-related
measurement and modeling and can be succinctly summarized
as follows. “Are the available measurements appropriate for
the purpose at hand?” and “Is modeling or model validation
reduced to some basic data-fitting exercise?”
The following is a necessarily subjective list of 10 lessons
that we have learned from about a decade worth of published
research on the AS-level Internet, with special focus on the
data that has fueled much of the research in this area. Our list
includes the major topic areas where the AS-level Internet has
played a prominent role. The observations on which we base
our lessons have become widely accepted within and outside
the networking research community, and a main goal of this
paper is to “de-mythify” each of these “facts” by examining
in detail how they fare in light of the above-stated critical
questions.
1) The notion of “inter-domain topology of the Internet” is
ambiguous, at best, without more precise definitions of
terms than typically provided.
2) The commonly-used practice of abstracting ASes to
generic atomic nodes without any internal structure is
an over-simplification that severely limits our ability
to capture critical features associated with real-world
ASes such as route diversity, policy diversity, or multi-
connectivity.
3) The traditional approach of modeling the AS-level Inter-
net as a simple connected di-graph is an abstraction inca-
pable of capturing important facets of the rich semantics
of real-world inter-AS relationships, including different
interconnections for different policies and/or different
interconnection points. The implications of such abstrac-
tions need to be recognized before attributing network-
specific meaning to findings derived from the resulting
models.
4) The BGP routing data that projects like RouteViews or
RIPE RIS have collected and made publicly available are
of enormous practical value for network operators, but
were never meant to be used for inferring or mapping the
AS-level connectivity of the Internet. The main reason
for this is that BGP was not designed with AS-level
topology discovery/mapping in mind; instead, BGP’s
purpose is to enable ASes to express and realize their
routing policies without revealing AS-internal features
and, to achieve this goal in a scalable manner, BGP has
to hide information that would otherwise aid topology
discovery.
5) The traceroute data that projects like Ark (CAIDA),
DIMES, or iPlane have collected and made publicly
available have been a boon to network researchers, but
are inherently limited for faithfully inferring or mapping
the AS-level connectivity of the Internet. The main
reason for this is that traceroute was not designed with
Internet topology discovery/mapping in mind; instead, it
is a diagnostic tool for tracking the route or path (and
measuring transit delays) of one’s packets to some host,
and to achieve this diagnostic task, traceroute can ignore
issues (e.g., interface aliasing) that would need to be
solved first were topology discovery its stated objective.
6) Significant additional efforts are required before current
models of the Internet’s inter-domain topology derived
from the publicly available and widely-used measure-
ment data can purposefully be used to study the perfor-
mance of new routing protocols and/or perform mean-
ingful simulation studies. At a minimum, such studies
need to be accompanied by strong robustness results that
demonstrate the insensitivity of reported claims to model
variations that attempt to address or remediate some of
the known shortcomings of the underlying models or
data.
7) When examining the vulnerability of the Internet to vari-
ous types of real-world threats or studying the Internet as
a critical infrastructure, it is in general inappropriate to
equate the Internet with a measured AS topology. In fact,
meaningful investigations of most vulnerability-related
aspects of the Internet typically require taking a more
holostic approach to Internet connectivity, accounting for
details of the physical infrastructure, of how physical
connectivity maps to various types of more virtual
connectity, of protocol-specific features, and of traffic-
related aspects that manifest themselves at the different
connectivity structures.
8) While there is a valid role for “observational” studies of
the Internet’s Autonomous System, the results of such
studies are in general hard to interpret. A more promi-
sing method involves performing controlled experiments
that allow one to discriminate alternative explanations
for results and prevent the effects of one confounding
factor from drowning out the effects of others.
9) Studies which start with a definite application, and
proceed to collect the best data available for that appli-
cation have shown a much higher rate of success than
“fishing expeditions”; that is, studies that target datasets
collected by third-parties and analyze them for the sake
of analysis.
10) In an environment like the Internet where high-
variability phenomena are the rule rather than the ex-
3ception and where the quality of the data cannot be
taken for granted, it is paramount to apply data-analytic
methods that have strong robustness properties to the
known deficiencies in the observations and naturally
account for the presence of extreme values in the data.
The list contains elements that range from definition and
meaning of the graph, to measurements and their appropri-
ateness for AS-related studies. They may seem repetitive, but
we prefer to err on the side of explicitly stating the problems,
rather than leaving the issues implicit.
Debunking past mistakes goes hand in hand with identifying
new and interesting directions for more purposeful and promi-
sing studies of the AS-level Internet, and our main motivation
for this paper is ultimately the latter and not the former.
Importantly, we believe that addressing the current deficiencies
will move us from treatments of the AS topology as an
uninspiring and often meaningless abstract graph towards an
approach that views the AS Internet as an economic construct
that is constrained by socio-technological factors and is driven
by economic incentives and business decisions made by the
major players in this area (e.g., service and content providers,
large corporations, governments). Although this notion has
been advanced by the networking operator community for
some time [5]–[9], the networking research community has
been slow to react and to distance itself from the popular graph
view of the inter-domain topology (examples of exceptions
include [10]–[12]).
II. BGP CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND IMPLICATIONS
Routing in the Internet is undertaken on two scales: within
an administrative domain or AS and between ASes. Separate
routing protocols (and separate routing tables) are used by
an AS to spread information about internal and external
destinations. The routing protocol used within an AS is termed
an Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) and is the choice of the
individual AS. The current de-facto standard inter-domain
routing protocol is the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [13]–
[16], and it is this protocol that concerns us in this section.
A. A Highly Scalable and Expressive Information Hiding
Protocol
The characteristics of BGP that have made it successful
are at the same time those which significantly add to its
complexity. BGP was designed as an “information hiding”
protocol, and it is very good at it. The features that contribute
to the information hiding capability include: (a) Scalability:
BGP runs on a distributed system whose size is the Internet.
Each autonomous network that is part of the Internet computes
the routes through which it can access the rest of the Internet.
To keep BGP scalable, only best paths towards a destination
are propagated. (b) Hiding of internal network structures: BGP
allows networks to exchange routing information between
them without revealing strategic information about their own
networks. For example, ASes are often not willing to share
sensitive business data, such as the number of routers inside
their network or their networks’ topological structure, which
customers are buying transit, traffic demands and/or routing
strategies, the location of a company’s data centers and all
available paths to reach a particular destination. An example
of how deceiving this information hiding capability can be is
given in [17]. The authors give examples of what they call “in-
duced updates”, where it is impossible for a monitor to pick-up
the root-cause. (c) Configuration flexibility: BGP provides the
operators with the expressive power they need to be able to
implement the complex and evolving business policies ASes
have with each another. By design, BGP hides the information
about these policies, and unless this information is published
somewhere else and independent from BGP (e.g., on the
company website or in the IRR [18]), it is in general difficult
or close to impossible to retrieve or infer it. Note that Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) today often have a much richer set
of policies and value-added services than widely discussed
in the literature [6], [19]. Section III-D highlights common
assumptions researchers make about business policies.
A BGP-speaking router operates by taking the information
about existing routes from its BGP neighbors, the IGP and
other sources. The router then makes a decision about which
of these provides the “best” route to each destination. These
best routes are then (subject to export policies) passed to the
router’s BGP neighbors. The process iterates until a stable
routing solution is found (if the protocol converges, which is
not in fact guaranteed [20], [21]). The output of the BGP’s
decision process involves policies that can result in routes that
may be far from shortest-paths.
The BGP best path selection process [16] and features are
well known [13]–[16], and they are critically important when
dealing with AS-related inferences. In the following, we list a
number of observations that are relevant for the remainder of
this paper:
• Every BGP-speaking router in the Internet obtains some
information by this routing process and uses this informa-
tion to route packets. However, this information passed
on by BGP is “selective”, not complete, in the sense that a
neighboring router only receives the output of a complex
selection process and not the various inputs.
• BGP announcements carry useful information. Most no-
tably, for AS topology-related work, they include AS-path
information.
• BGP can behave badly, based on non-local policies. For
instance, an external policy change over which AS’s
network administrator has no control can cause an un-
expected and/or undesirable shift in traffic on the AS’s
network. The lack of global transparency makes BGP
very hard to debug [22].
• The AS-path in the BGP update messages is inserted
for loop detection and also to provide some form of
distance metric. However, there is no guarantee that traffic
is actually flowing along that AS-path [19].
B. BGP Monitor Limitations
As a service to ISPs and the operational community, in the
late 1990’s two organizations started collecting and distribut-
ing (near) real-time BGP routing information gathered from
a number of backbone networks. Those projects are widely
referred to as RouteViews [23] and RIPE RIS [24]. They
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are essentially just normal PC’s running routing software such
as Quagga [25]. Initially, only large providers connected to
this service and provided feeds, but later on this service also
became popular at IXPs (Internet eXchange Points).
Typically, these monitors record all the BGP update in-
formation they receive from their neighbors. They do not
announce any prefixes, they do not send or receive traffic—
although there are exceptions [26]. The resulting records are
the primary source of BGP data that many researchers use.
Both the RouteViews and RIPE RIS projects have collected
amazing datasets in the terabytes range providing approxi-
mately a decade worth of Internet-wide BGP routing infor-
mation. The data is currently collected from several hundreds
of vantage points in the Internet and is publicly available in
open data formats. The data has been a huge boon to network
operators debugging network configurations, and the continued
reliability of the Internet literally depends on these datasets.
A common characteristic of the RouteViews and RIPE RIS
projects is the explicitly- and specifically-stated purpose for
collecting BGP routing information in the first place. Both
projects were originally motivated by interest on the part of
operators in determining how the global routing system viewed
their prefixes and/or AS space (see [23], [27]). Importantly,
both projects have been silent about the use of their data for
mapping the inter-domain topology of the Internet, and for
good reasons. First and foremost, the data obtained from a
BGP monitor has many limitations, arising principally from
the nature of BGP itself, and include:
1) The monitor can only see what the connected router
chooses to send along. Care is needed when interpreting
what is in the data. Contrary to popular belief, one does
not see the Internet as seen by the connected router. At
best, it may be possible to anticipate what a downstream
neighbor might receive1.
2) The type of information that can be collected is also not
always the same. Most feeds are, what is often called, a
“full-feed” (or “default-free” routing table [28]). How-
ever, some feeds are “partial feeds” and first go through
some filtering process before being sent on to the
collector. For example, this may happen at IXPs where
the feed is set up for other ASes to show them which
routes would be learned if a particular form of peering
agreement were signed.
3) Some ASes are very large and span multiple continents.
Operators often aim at keeping traffic reasonably local,
so that the view that is collected in, say, New York,
might be very different from a view that is collected
within the same AS in, say, Tokyo.
4) The current monitors are connected in only a few
locations, and each monitor has only a limited view-
point. Moreover, the locations of these monitors are not
randomly distributed across the Internet, but are biased
1This is a rough approximation, because updates depend on BGP timers that
influence what is sent when (which is typically different for each neighbor).
In addition, such a downstream router is typically connected to other routers
as well, which are not monitored. Therefore, this “input connectivity” of a
router is hard to model as well, as it depends on factors such as, type and
function of a router, location and AS-related strategies.
towards larger core networks and IXPs.
5) The connections between BGP monitors and routers are
not 100% reliable. Session resets, collector down times,
and missing updates cause missing data among other
problems [29]. Verifying and cross-checking the BGP
data is essential, otherwise the data could easily be
misinterpreted [30], [31].
6) BGP is a path-vector protocol, which means that a
single triggering event may cause multiple updates to
be observed at a collector, depending on timer-states,
topology, and vendor implementation [26], [32].
7) Various artifacts appear in the data. With respect to
deriving the inter-domain topology from BGP data, one
instance is of particular concern: path poisoning [33].
Path poisoning is a technique used by some opera-
tors and researchers to announce prefixes that contain
misleading AS-path information to trigger (false) loop
detection at remote ASes.
Generally speaking, the above limitations fall into two
categories: artifacts and systematically missing data. Artifacts
are not easy to fix, but may with care be handled. On the
other hand, systematically missing data is very hard to deal
with. In view of the wide-spread use of this data by researchers
for the purpose of studying the inter-domain topology of the
Internet, we note here that when relying on third-party data
that was collected for a specific purpose and using it for a
very different purpose, a key question that needs to be asked
and answered [34] is “are the existing measurements (which
were collected for a specific purpose) of sufficient quality for
the purpose for which I want to use them, and how do the
defects in the data affect the inferences I intend to make?”
The popular approach of simply using the available Route-
Views or RIPE RIS data when trying to study AS-level
topology has been pursued for more than a decade without
answering the above question. Clearly, taking the data at face
value and deriving from them results that are actually trust-
worthy is highly problematic. The problem is in interpretation,
that is converting the data into useful information. This process
is fraught because BGP was designed for a particular process
(routing) and not for mapping the inter-domain topology. The
information contained in the protocol is not the information
that most AS topology investigators would ask for. As noted
in [35], “what we can measure in an Internet-like environment
is typically not the same as what we really want to measure (or
what we think we actually measure).” In much of science, we
make do with what we can get, but nevertheless, it is important
to consider whether such an investigation sheds light on any
real problems, or becomes purely an act of sophistry.
C. Other measurements
Looking glass servers are another source of BGP data (with
the same limitations), but the information they provide is
generally highly constrained in space and time. The Internet
Routing Registries (IRRs) provide useful information in gen-
eral, but are known to contain a significant amount of stale or
incomplete data and are therefore typically of limited practical
use [36], [37].
Yet another set of data comes from the data plane using
traceroute. Although this is a fundamentally different
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more severe, limitations than BGP measurements. Like the
BGP monitors, traceroute [38] is a debugging tool that
was never intended to measure topology. Its problems are
even more extensive than those of BGP, though outside the
scope of this paper (see [35], [39] for details). The fact that
traceroute returns a router path, while BGP returns a path
in AS-hops, suggests that these are orthogonal measurements
and therefore complementary. In reality, they just overlap the
same problem space. An additional difficulty is mapping IP
addresses to ASes [40], [41], which may mean that combining
these is impractical. At best, there is the problem that the paths
seen by the routing protocol and the data plane may just have
different, incompatible meanings.
III. FROM ASES TO AS TOPOLOGIES
In the previous section, we emphasized the critical need to
understand the basics of BGP when trying to interpret the BGP
routing information that has been collected and made publicly
available by projects such RouteViews or RIPE RIS. Here we
focus on the use of this information in past studies that reduce
the Autonomous System Internet to a simple graph.
A. The Definition of an Autonomous System
One key ingredient of a graph is its nodes. In the context of
the AS-level Internet, it is tempting to simply equate a node
with an AS, but this begs the question what an AS really
is. Most papers loosely define an Autonomous System as a
region in the Internet which is under a single administrative
control. The term “administrative control” implies a company
with commercial interests in the Internet that operates in
this space following certain business strategies and targeting
specific market niches. However, the reality is more subtle
than this.
From a technical perspective, an AS is often viewed in terms
of the AS number (ASN) allocated by IANA (Internet As-
signed Numbers Authority) or the Regional Internet Registries
(RIRs). An ASN is tendered to enable routing using BGP.
An extension of this view is to define an AS in terms of its
destination prefixes. This is an association that is measurable,
say by traceroutes or routing monitors. Exceptions to this view
include ASes that number internal links from unannounced
address space (such as specified in RFC 1918 [42]). Anycast
or Multiple Origin AS [43] provide yet another set of counter-
examples to a straight-forward mapping between ASN and
address space.
Even when it is well defined, the above clashes with the
popular view that associates an AS with a set of routers that
appear to the outside as if they formed a single coherent
system. The administrative view and the logical address-based
view of an AS are often inconsistent. An organization may
often own a router which has at least one interface IP address
belonging to another organization. In fact, many point-to-
point IP links occur across a “/30” subnet. When the link
joins two networks, this subnet must be allocated from the
IP blocks of one or the other connecting network, and so
most such connections result in IP addresses from neighboring
ASes appearing locally. The problem is exacerbated when an
ISP manages the edge router of one of its customers. Such
problems make it exceedingly hard to even define the edge of
an AS, let alone measure it.
Another problem arises from the fact that although an AS
is often considered to correspond to a single technical admin-
istrative domain, i.e., a network run by one organization, it is
common practice for a single organization to manage multiple
ASes, each with their own ASN [44]. For instance, Verizon
Business (formerly known as UUNET) uses ASNs 701, 702,
703 to separate its E-BGP network into three geographic
regions, but runs a single IGP instance throughout its whole
network. In terms of defining nodes of a graph, these three
networks are all under the same operational administrative
control, and hence should be viewed as a single node. On the
other hand, as far as ASNs are concerned, they are different
and should be treated as three separate nodes. The situation
is actually more complex since corporations like Verizon
Business may own some 200+ ASNs [44] (not all are actually
used, though). In many of these cases, a clear boundary
between these multiple ASes may not really exist, thus blurring
the definition of the meaning of a node in an AS graph. Similar
problems can arise when a single AS is managed by multiple
adminstrative authorities which consist of individuals from
different corporations. For example, AS 2914 is run partially
by NTT/America and partially by NTT/Asia.
All this presumes that an AS is a uniform, continguous
entity, but that is not necessarily true. An AS may very well
announce different sets of prefixes at different exit points of
its network, or use BGP to balance traffic across overloaded
links (other reasons for non-homogeneous configurations are
reported in [28]).
For all these reasons, it should be clear that modeling an AS
as a single generic node without internal (or external) structure
is overly simplistic for most practical problems. Moreover,
these issues cannot simply be addressed by moving towards
graph representations that can account for some internal node
structure (such as in [45]), mainly because BGP is unlikely to
reveal sufficient information to infer the internal structure for
the purpose of faithful modeling.
B. AS Connectivity
We have seen that the definition of an AS is fraught with
problems. Assuming for the time being that the concept of
an AS is well defined so that it makes sense to equate each
AS with a node in a graph, then what is the set of links?
Unfortunately, the question of which ASes are “connected”
also has no simple answer, and defining the meaning of a
“link” between two ASes requires further consideration.
Does a connection mean the ASes have a business relation-
ship, physical connectivity, connecting BGP session, or that
they share traffic? All the above are reasonable definitions,
and none are equivalent.
A common construction is an undirected graph G = (V, E)
where the nodes or vertices V are the ASes and the edges
E are the connections between ASes. Two ASes are said
to be connected (at a particular time), if they can exchange
routing data (and presumably IP traffic) without the help of
an intermediary AS that provides transit. In essence, what
6we have just defined is a representation of the BGP routing
structure as a simple graph. The main question is whether or
not this abstraction is of any practical use or relevance.
C. AS Graph Meaning and Extensions
It should be clear from our earlier arguments that the
abstraction of the BGP-routing structure of the Internet to
a simple graph loses a great deal of information and is an
overly simplistic way to view the Internet. All we are seeing
is the BGP routing structure of the network, and it is wrong
to assume this is somehow the fundamental topology of the
Internet. In fact, this graph representation is not a particularly
useful topology for any practical purpose. We can make it
more purposeful by being more careful about its definition.
First, the AS graph should really be a multigraph. It is
very common for two ASes to be connected by multiple
links and in different geographic locations [6], [46], [47]. The
idea is clearly illustrated by Figure 1 in [46], which shows a
“pancake” diagram of the North American Internet backbone.
This fact has often been ignored when considering topics such
as reliability of the AS graph under link or node failures [48],
although it is a necessary ingredient for such studies. Apart
from the need to quantify the number of redundant paths
available, a failure of a physical link between two ASes might
not be visible to any external observer at all (maybe not even
throughout the ASes themselves), while a small change in IGP
cost could trigger many hot-potato route changes visible in
large portion of the Internet [49]–[51]. Perhaps the reason this
critical aspect of the topology is typically ignored is that it is
hard to measure—BGP monitor data is in general blind to this
facet of the topology.
Second, the AS graph should really be a hypergraph. A
single “edge” can connect multiple ASes. This is common
in an IXP—physical infrastructures managed by third parties
where networks can choose to peer with one another for the
purpose of exchanging traffic directly, and essentially for free,
compared to using some upstream service provider at a cost.
At IXPs multiple networks are joined together at one physical
location [9], [52]–[54]. One might argue that they are joined
by a switch/router, each using point-to-point links, but in at
least some cases, that switch has no place in a purely AS-level
graph, and so must be considered as a hyperlink between more
than two ASes.
Third, ASes are not atomic. It should be clear that an AS
is a geographically distributed entity [55], but the problem
is even deeper. ASes are comprised of multiple components
(routers and the like) distributed over some area of space. In
principle (according to the RFCs) the AS should have one
routing policy. Not only is it not exactly clear what this means,
but it is clearly not true [28], [45], [52]. The components of
an AS may not even be contiguous. An AS may rely on a
provider AS for transit of its traffic between multiple otherwise
disconnected components.
Lastly, there is no clean 1:1 mapping between “network”
and “organization” and “AS” [44], [52]. A single organization
may use multiple ASes to implement its network, or it may
acquire a number of ASes as a result of mergers and acqui-
sitions. A single AS may also represent multiple networks or
companies. It is not uncommon for a small network operator
to have a single transit provider, in which case there is often
no need for them to route using BGP. In this case, they don’t
need an ASN, and they simply appear to be part of the provider
AS.
In summary, the AS-graph by itself and as defined above
is not particularly useful. It may have some scientific interest
(though this should be tempered by an understanding of what
it really is), but it is not applicable by itself, not to Internet-
relevant problems in particular. To be useful, say for predicting
network behavior under policy changes or failures, one must
also understand something of the policy relationships. It is that
point we address next.
D. Policies and Relationships
If the AS-graph by itself and as defined earlier is to be of any
use in conjunction with analyzing or controlling BGP routing,
we must label the edges and nodes with policies. Although
different engineers can define many different policies, these
policies must be implemented through BGP, and hence the
possible implementations are less rich or varied than the
possible policies. It has been common to approximate the
range of policies between ASes by a simple set of three
relationships: (a) customer-provider, (b) peer-peer, and (c)
siblings. This reduction was at least in part motivated by
Huston [7], [8] and has been used in various places [9], [56]–
[58].
While many relationships fall into these three categories,
there are frequent exceptions [45], [52], for instance, in the
form of partial transit in a particular region [5], [19]. One
way that the partial transit relationship can be implemented is
as a hybrid between the customer-provider and the peer-peer
relationship: the subscriber receives routes from the provider’s
customers and peers, but not the provider’s providers.
Routing under policies (a)-(c) has the “valley-free property”,
which both leads to estimation algorithms and simplifies the
behavior of BGP. Although the “valley-free property” is taken
for granted in a number of papers, there are cases which
argue for the opposite2. One research study [60] that attempted
to “quantitatively characterize BGP announcements that vi-
olate the so-called valley-free property” stated that “valley
announcements are more pervasive than expected” even in the
biased dataset collected from BGP monitors (see Section II-B).
They report that 14 out of the 15 ASes that they classify as
tier-1 propagate valley announcements. They also recognize
that, apart from misconfigurations, there are intentional valley
announcements and they attribute them to complex policies of
middle-sized intermediate providers.
There are reasons why researchers still use this simplified
set of business relationships. Several studies need to model
“intent”; for example, in routing security one needs a model of
the intended routing to show attacks against it. The simplified
model of relationships provides an easy way to achieve such
a goal. The critical point when using this model, though,
is to show that the results of the study do not rely on it
despite using it. For example, a researcher could enhance the
2It was publicly reported [59] that when PSI depeered AboveNet, Verio
gave AboveNet transit to/from PSI.
7experiments with additional topologies and show that the work
is not particularly sensitive to the model assumptions.
Forgetting for the moment the simplification in assuming all
policies fit this model, and the simplifications the AS-graph
itself makes, the relationships can be represented in the graph
by providing simple labels for each edge. In this case, the
literature starts categorizing ASes into “tiers” [9], [56]. The
concept of “tiers” starts with the tier-1 networks, often defined
as those that don’t buy transit from any other AS. As such
these networks must peer with each other in a clique. Then,
below these are the tier-2 providers who are customers of the
tier-1 networks, but peer with each other to some extent, and
so on for as many levels as your model suggests.
Another approach is to infer a more generic set of policies
consistent with routing observations using a more detailed set
of routing measurements [45], [61] and estimate performance
by comparing predicted routes to real routes (held back from
the inference process).
E. The AS Graph Set
When we consider the above, we start to understand the
challenge of giving a precise meaning to the notion of “the”
AS graph. In reality, there are multiple incarnations of this
graph, each with its own meaning, structure, potential ap-
plications, and inference problems. Table I lists some of the
possible graphs, all of which have ASes as nodes.
• business relationship graph: in its simplest form this
graph simply indicates (by an edge) that a business
relationship exists between the corporations that own two
ASNs. Edges could be usefully labelled by the type of
business relationship, and we list a small subset of the
possible relationships in Table I.
• physical link-level graph: this graph indicates whether
two ASNs have a physical (layer 1) connection, and how
many such connections they have. The multiple nature of
such connections leads this to being a multigraph. The
fact that some physical connections are through entities,
such as IXPs, that connect multiple ASes leads to this
graph being a hypergraph. The graph’s edges could be
usefully annotated with link capacity and potentially other
features such as geographic location.
• connectivity graph: this graph indicates that layer-2 con-
nectivity exists between two ASNs. In many cases the
layer-2 connectivity between ASNs would be congruent
with the layer-1 connectivity, but with recent advances in
network virtualization this may not hold for long [62].
• BGP routing graph: the edges in this graph indicate pairs
of ASes that have an active BGP session exchanging
routing information (i.e., a BGP session that is in the
‘established’ state [16]).
• policy graph: the edges in this graph are the same as those
in the BGP routing graph, but include directed policy
annotations [63]. We define this separately from the BGP
routing graph because it may require a multigraph to
allow for policy differences between different regions.
• traffic graph: it is the same as the BGP routing graph,
but the edges are annotated with the amount of traffic
exchanged between the corresponding ASes.
Obviously, the definitions above are arbitrary, and could be
changed, but they are used here to highlight the ambiguity
behind the term “AS graph” and its manifold meanings. Most
commonly, what is meant by the AS topology is the structure
of the routing graph, possibly with some elements of the
policy graph. However, it appears unusual for studies to even
define precisely what graph they examine (exceptions being
papers such as [9], [64], [65] where the BGP routing graph is
explicitly considered).
Rare studies have tried to capture other views, e.g., [47]
using other methods such as traceroute. However, as noted in
Section II-C, since traceroute has its own set of problems when
used to map either intra- or inter-domain topologies, the results
of such studies need to be examined very carefully and with
full knowledge and explanation of the limits and applicability
of the technique.
IV. LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT AS-GRAPH SNAPSHOTS
As noted in the Introduction, there are a number of lessons
researchers have learnt over the last decade. Lessons 1-3 have
been discussed at length already. Lessons 4-7 are the topic of
this Section. The core issue is that BGP was not intended for
the purpose of measuring the AS graph. In using data from
both RouteViews and RIPE RIS in ways other than intended,
the question is raised about its suitability. We have commented
extensively on the limitations of those measurements, but here
we will examine the impact of these limitations.
As far as we know, the first researchers to use BGP route
monitor data for topology-related work were Govindan and
Reddy [64]. They introduced the notion of the inter-domain
topology defined as “the graph of domains and the inter-
domain peering relationships.” Specifically, they defined a
link in this graph to signify route exchange between the
corresponding domains. The paper is quite specific about
the nature of the problem that the authors were interested
in3. Since the authors hypothesized that two characteristics
of the routing system (i.e., the inter-domain topology and
route stability) impact Internet wide-area communication, they
needed to understand, among other things, features of the
Internet’s inter-domain topology and relied on available BGP
route monitor data “to derive an approximate characterization
of the inter-domain topology.”
The paper that coined the term “Internet topology” and is
undoubtedly better known and more widely cited than [64] is
Faloutsos et al. [69]. While this paper is largely responsible
for launching much of the subsequent significant research
activity in this area, it is also responsible for advancing the
alluring notion that the inter-domain topology of the Internet
is a well-defined object and can be accurately obtained and
reconstructed from the available BGP route monitor data.
In fact, starting with [69], the approximate nature of the
inferred inter-domain topology and the limitations of the
underlying BGP route monitor data emphasized in [64] have
been largely ignored, and the majority of later papers in this
area typically only cite [69] and no longer [64]. Unfortunately,
3
“A study of the Internet inter-domain routing system; that is, the collection
of domains, their policies and peering relationships, and the address prefixes
they advertise.”
8Graph Edge Annotation Graph Type
business relationship subsidiary, partner, customer,... directed graph
physical link-level link capacity multi- hyper-graph
connectivity graph - multigraph
BGP routing graph - undirected graph
policy graph BGP policies directed multigraph
traffic graph traffic volumes directed graph
TABLE I: Example elements of the set of AS graphs.
Paper Date Measured Estimated
Zhang et al. [66] 2004-10-24 45,058 55,388
He et al. [37] 2005-05-12 47,199 59,500
Mu¨hlbauer et al. [45] 2005-11-13 49,241 58,903
Roughan et al. [67] 2004-01 38,397 42,818
2005-01 45,814 54,582
2006-01 50,129 59,319
2007-01 57,038 68,856
2008-01 63,536 76,944
Dhamdhere et al. [68] end of 2007 70,000 -
TABLE II: Past estimates of links in the AS-graph.
as commented in [34], the impact of such secondary citations
in the measurement arena is especially severe, since critical
information available in the original work is often obscured
or forgotten. In this context, even a very limited examination
of the main Internet topology-related publications in the field
of “network science” (e.g., [70], [71]) is illuminating.
The most notable problem in the AS-graph measurement
and inference is missing data, primarily missing edges. Most
reachable ASes appear in a BGP monitor’s view4, and so when
we combine data from multiple monitors it is unlikely that
more than a few active ASes are missing. However, there are
a very significant number of missing edges [9], [45], [54],
[65]–[67], [73], [74].
Table II shows several estimates reported in these papers
and obtained using different techniques, for instance using
additional sources of data: IRRs, and Looking Glasses, as well
as additional route monitors (some 1,000 in [45]), or statistical
techniques [67]. While the approaches used are very different,
most of these studies come up with similar numbers on the
order of about 20% of the total number of edges, but there is no
ground-truth to verify or falsify the accuracy of such estimates.
However, if the recent study [54] that focuses exclusively on
discovering missing links at IXPs is any indication, the number
of missing edges may be significantly larger – quite likely
between 50-100%.
We know that the above missing edges cause significant
problems in inferring the AS graph. For instance, it is a
requirement that a network be multi-homed to obtain an ASN.
This means the AS needs to intent to connect to at least two
upstream providers. In this sense a “single-homed stub-AS”
does not exist. Without any doubt, there are exceptions to this
rule. However, the second link is often a backup link which is
invisible to BGP outside of the immediate connection, because
of BGP’s information hiding5. Thus, it may appear as if a large
number of ASes are single-homed stubs.
In [65] the authors separate the missing links into ‘hidden’
and ‘invisible’ (for a given set of monitors). The important
point about invisible links is that these are links that are
missing from the data for structural reasons, that is, it is not
just a question of quantity (i.e., numbers of monitors) but
quality (i.e., location of monitor). In [67] the authors divide
links into a number of classes based on their observability and
develop a class based estimator for each of these. We can,
thus, place reasonable lower-bounds on the numbers of links
that are missing from the data, and know that many such links
4This is because typically an AS announces at least one prefix. There are
of course exceptions, as discussed in Section III-A. Furthermore, note that it
is not guaranteed that all ASes are reachable from all other ASes [72].
5Note that complex BGP policies may play a role in this as well [22], [75].
exist, but it is hard to put a tight upper bound on the number,
because we cannot see what we just cannot see.
The problem with missing links is much more serious than
if those links were “missing at random”. In particular, the
bias in the type of links that are missing is critical when
calculating some metrics on the graph, such as distances,
precisely because such links are often designed to cut down
on the number of ASes traffic must traverse.
Typically, the next step after inferring network topology is
to infer policies between ASes. The most common approach
to this problem is to assume the universality of the peer-
peer, customer-provider, sibling-sibling model, and to infer
the policies by finding an allocation of policies consistent
with the observed routing [9], [57], [58], [74], [76], [77].
Once relationships are established, a seemingly reasonable
next step is to estimate the hierarchical structure as in [9],
[56]. However, the effect of large numbers of (biased) missing
links has not really been considered in these algorithms. In
fact, the tier structure of the Internet seems to be largely an
illusion. Recent work has shown that there is little value in the
model at present [9], [12], [78]; but, in contrast to the claims
of these papers, there is no strong evidence that the situation
has actually changed or that the tier model was ever a good
model.
The tier-1 ISPs may be a realistic concept, though searches
for cliques amongst groups of large providers always produce
smaller sets than any reasonable grouping suggested by the
nature and scope of the companies involved. In reality, even
if the tier-1 concept is correct, it ignores the transitory nature
of the network and the business relationships that need to be
maintained to keep connections alive.
There is also a natural set of “bottom tier” ISPs who do
not provide transit to any other BGP speaking ISP (they
certainly can provide transit to other ISPs, just not the ones
that appear as separate ASes). We sometimes call these “stub”
ASes (though note that even in the simple AS-graph they
may not be degree one nodes). These actually form the vast
majority, some 30,000 of the 36,000 or so ASes do not appear
to provide transit today.
However, it is very difficult to classify the intermediate
transit-providing ASes. Certainly there are ambiguities be-
cause one AS may appear to be in different tiers based on
its relationship with various other providers, and there can
be no consistent labeling as a result. More serious though,
are the problems with the whole model that assumes that all
relationships are of these types—as we have noted ASes are
often not homogenous.
Other analyses of the AS-graph have included studies of its
reliability [48]. Once again, ignorance of the approximations
9in the AS-graph (for instance of the multilink nature of the
real connections), and the problems in measurements (the
number of missing edges) invalidate such studies completely.
Likewise for other graph-based metrics [79] applied without
understanding the above issues.
V. LOOKING AHEAD
Given our list of problems described here, one might be
tempted to think that the AS-graph and routing data in general
are useless until these datasets are drastically improved. How-
ever, apart from their operational utility, RouteViews and RIPE
RIS have provided the essential ingredients for many important
studies that match the services’ goals [80]. A number of these
studies have improved the Internet significantly, and in the
majority of such successful papers there is no need to exploit
the “graph” view of the network. Examples include: (a) The
discovery of slow convergence and persistence oscillation in
routing protocols [9], [20], [81]–[86]. (b) Understanding of the
impacts (positive and negative) of route flap dampening [87],
[88]. (c) Determining how much address space and how many
ASNs are being actively used [89]. (d) Looking for routing
“Bogons” often related to Internet address hijacking [90]–[94].
(e) Debugging network problems [9], [17], [95], [96].
On the measurement side, there have also been many
advancements towards improving our view of AS topology.
For instance:
1) As BGP routing changes, often multiple potential paths
are explored and these paths (which are unlikely to
actually be used as a final choice) can show some of
the alternative routes available in the network [66], and
thus a more complete topology.
There is an unfortunate side-effect of this type of mea-
surement. It introduces a Heisenberg-like uncertainty
principle. It is not clear whether observed changes are
due to the micro-phenomenon of path exploration, or
macro-phenomena of link changes, new entrants, etc.
The longer we make observations, the more complete
they may seem, but we then do not know whether all of
those links existed at the same time. Such uncertainty
principles appear to be present in a number of Internet
measurement contexts [97] where we trade off “accu-
racy” of the measurements against “time localization”.
This approach does not overcome the structural bias.
2) Missing edges can be found using additional datasets,
e.g., RIRs and looking glasses [37], [66], [73], [98],
or IXP data [9], [37], [54], [98], though care must be
exercised with any additional dataset.
3) Beacons [26], [28], [82]: a routing beacon is just a
router that advertises and withdraws certain prefixes
on a regular schedule. Examination of the observed
announcements and withdrawals by various route mon-
itors then allows estimates of protocol behavior such as
convergence time.
4) Route poisoning prevents announcement from reaching
certain parts of the Internet. As with beacons, it allows
one to examine the behavior of BGP in a more controlled
manner. This is perhaps the only way to see (some)
backup paths, or to understand whether an ISP uses
default routing [28], [33].
5) There are also attempts to not just estimate the topology
but derive some quality measure for the resultant AS-
graph [67], [99], [100].
On the one hand, these and other advances on the mea-
surement side suggest that the missing link problem may
be solved in the not-too-distant future, paving the way for
highly predictable future research efforts focusing on a new
round of characterizing and modeling these “more complete”
AS graphs. However, when trying to understand the reasons
for the various advancements on the measurement front and
examining the sources that yield the improved data, it becomes
increasingly obvious that genuine advances on the research
front will not come from “more of the same”—traditional stu-
dies of the Internet’s AS graph as a graph-theoretical construct
devoid of most features or attributes that make it relevant and
interesting from a networking perspective. Instead, the latest
measurement efforts and resulting data all highlight the fact
that the AS-level Internet is much richer and rewarding than
what can be described with a simple di-graph. Providing a
mathematical framework that fully reflects and respects that
richness and supports the search for the main technological
and economic factors that shape the AS-level Internet and
are responsible for its evolution will be at the heart of new
scientific advances in this area. The reward of these new efforts
promises to be a unique ability to successfully reverse-engineer
this critical Internet construct for the purpose of strategically
influencing its future functioning and evolution.
In addition to defining a rather unconventional agenda for
future research in this area, the recent advancements on the
measurement side listed above also relate directly to lessons
8-10. First, controlled experiments (i.e., experiments that have
a “control” sample against which the experimental data can
be compared) are necessary in order to precisely derive which
factors of interest affect which variables. Controls allow one
to discriminate alternative explanations for results, and prevent
the affects of one confounding factor drowning out the affects
of others (see [26], [28]). This is basic tenet of the scientific
method, but seems to have been ignored in this area of
research. Most studies have been “observational”, and while
there is a valid role for such experiments, for instance in
epidemiology, they are intrinsically harder to interpret.
Second, we have much more hope for studies that set
out to measure a particular phenomena, or solve a particular
problem (for some instances see [9], [101]), and which design
their measurements around that problem than we do for
“fishing expeditions” which simply take a set of data, and
mess around with it until they find something apparently of
interest. The latter approach is more often uncritical of the
flaws in the data, because at the end of the day the results are
often treated uncritically, whereas results aimed at solving a
particular problem are assessed by whether they really solve
that problem.
Third, in a world where high-variability phenomena are the
rule rather than the exception and where the quality of the data
cannot be taken for granted, it is paramount to apply data-
analytic methods that have strong robustness properties to the
known deficiencies in the observations and naturally account
for the presence of extreme values in the data. A common
approach in, for instance, machine learning towards providing
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better quality measures of performance is to hold out some set
of data for testing the quality of inferences made with a set of
training data, and this approach has much to be recommended
in this context too, despite the fact the idea has been used
sparingly (see for instance [45]).
VI. CONCLUSION
The underlying story of this paper may seem to be one
of woe and tragedy. We start with flaky data, progress to
uninformed, uncritical interpretation, and finish without ap-
plication. Can anything be done?
The answer is yes. However, in writing this paper we hope
to illuminate the critical aspects of the AS-graph that every
researcher working in this area or using the available data
should know. While past research has identified important and
difficult problems, it is the way these problems have been
“solved” that we critique in this paper. By emphasizing that
constructs such as the inter-domain topology of the Internet
cannot be treated justly as simple abstract graphs –devoid
of essentially all network-specific meaning– we outline some
directions forward towards solving a set of more challenging,
interesting, and ultimately more rewarding problems. The
lessons of this paper will hopefully form a checklist for
any student or new researcher in this area that will enable
them to avoid the pitfalls which have reduced the value of
some past research. Simply stated, to ensure value of future
research in this area, any work on the structure and evolution
of the Internet’s Autonomous System has to account for the
economic, technological, and social forces that shape this
critical element of the Internet.
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